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We bring together two topics (quantum mechanics and time passage) with the goal of clarifying
questions about each. Specifically, we claim that the formalism of quantum mechanics provides an
answer to the question: “What is time passage?”.
I. INTRODUCTION
What is time passage? Why is quantum mechanics a
successful theory of the world? We claim that by address-
ing the first question, we gain insight into the second. In
particular, we propose a mathematical correlate to time
passage, and show that this construction, along with un-
controversial operational assumptions, place constraints
on the kind of physics an observer might see. Finally, we
provide support for the conjecture that these constraints
make quantum mechanics a forced move.
Time’s direction and time passage are two related but
distinct issues in the philosophy of time. The novel con-
struction we propose as a path to quantum mechanics
relates to time passage. However, since time passage
must be defined relative to time’s direction, time’s direc-
tion logically precedes time passage. In practical terms,
we imagine looking at a pile of unordered photographs
taken of a laboratory during an experiment. We further
imagine that the experimenter has a glass of ice water on
the table throughout the experiment. The progress of ice
cubes melting in the glass provides a reliable proxy for
how the photographs should be ordered, past to present.
The question of time passage relates to how we under-
stand the experimenter to be the same person in each
photograph, beyond spatiotemporal proximity in a ge-
ometrized space-time.
Our argument hinges on the question of what counts as
an explanation of the common sense notion of time pas-
sage. There is a tension in philosophy of physics between
realists, who seek in physics an observer-independent
story of what is going on, and instrumentalists, who
view physics as nothing more than an exercise in orga-
nizing the records of observers’ experiences. Even the
most staunch realist will concede that a physical theory
must have implications for our experience, expressed in
statements such as
“Ibefore prepared the system in state S;
then Iafter performed measurement M ,
which resulted in outcome O.” (1)
While it is not customary to use distinct symbols for
Ibefore and Iafter, we do so here in order to probe the role
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(if any) played by time passage. To what degree must
a physical theory explain the relationship between Ibefore
and Iafter? The block universe (“timeless”) picture of the
world asserts that Ibefore and Iafter are distinct slices of
the assemblage of world lines traced by the particles in
the observer’s body. In this view, time passage does not
have a correlate, and if we are surprised by this state of
affairs, it is because we were confused about passage to
begin with (“passage as illusion”).
Does time passage need a correlate in physical the-
ory? To aid our intuition regarding what an answer to
this question might look like, we consider the example
of color. Color has a correlate in physical theory (i.e.,
the frequency of electromagnetic waves). Before Maxwell
solidified the connection between light and electromag-
netism, it was possible to believe that color is fundamen-
tal (i.e., not reducible to any other aspect of our expe-
rience). However, in this scenario, it would have been a
mistake to assert that “color is an illusion”.
Maxwell’s equations explain one aspect of human ex-
perience (color) in terms of another (electromagnetism).
That is, color was naturalized by Maxwell’s equations.
This is the normal sequence of events in the scientific
process. An aspect of human experience (e.g., color) has
the status of a primitive of reality, until a connection to
a distinct aspect of human experience (e.g., electromag-
netism) is discovered. The explanatory power of this con-
nection allows deeper understanding of both sides of the
connection, and puts to rest the idea that the explained
phenomenon was an illusion.
Maxwell brought together areas of human experience
that a priori seem very different: color vision and elec-
tromagnetism. Evidence of the distance he bridged in
conceptual space is provided by the persistent suspicion
that there are aspects of color vision that go beyond
physics (c.f. qualia and the Mary’s Room thought ex-
periment [1]). If, as we claim, time passage is like color,
then time passage should have a mathematical correlate.
For color, the mathematical correlate is Maxwell’s equa-
tions. We shall argue that the mathematical correlate for
time passage leads directly to the structure of quantum
mechanics. If we succeed, the payoff is two-fold: insight
into the nature of time, and an answer to Wheeler’s ques-
tion “Why the quantum?”[2].
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2II. OTHER WORK LINKING TIME PASSAGE
AND QUANTUM MECHANICS
We will refer to several papers in which connections
(either direct or via analogy) are identified between quan-
tum mechanics and time passage. However, an important
reference for our approach is one that focuses only on
time. Tim Maudlin has championed the minority view
that it is a mistake to accept physics without time pas-
sage [3]. Rather, he argues, time passage should be re-
garded as fundamental. His analysis is important for our
effort because it represents a rare voice dissenting from
the prevailing view of time as illusion. We and Maudlin
agree that time passage must appear in our theory of
the world. However, while Maudlin takes time passage
to be fundamental, we assert that time passage can be
explained in terms of other aspects of our experience.
Simon Saunders presented an extended analogy be-
tween controversies in quantum mechanics and philoso-
phy of time [4]. His motivation was to defend the Everett
interpretation from the following criticism: if no element
of the superposition is selected to be more real than any
other during a measurement event, there is no way to
make sense of probabilities. He points out that the argu-
ments criticizing Everett’s lack of a mechanism for identi-
fying one outcome as actual are no stronger than the cor-
responding critique of the block universe, in which there
is no mechanism for picking out one time as Now. Thus,
it is inconsistent to take on board the block universe while
rejecting Everett on these grounds. Saunders argues that
the block universe and Everett rise and fall together, with
regard to the question of whether something is missing.
While his position is that they rise together, ours is that
they do, in fact, miss something. Nonetheless, his argu-
ment is relevant to our approach because it leverages anx-
iety about the extravagance of many worlds to sharpen
the focus on the problem of time passage, which, hav-
ing remained inscrutable for thousands of years, is often
regarded as insoluble or not even a problem.
N. David Mermin also identifies a kinship between the
interpretation of quantum mechanics and the philoso-
phy of time [5]. In particular, he argues that progress
made by Chris Fuchs and Ru¨diger Schack in the “QBism”
project [6] also serves to calm anxiety about the absence
of the Now in the block universe. This argument follows
a similar architecture to that of Saunders (collapse-less
quantum mechanics and the Now-less block universe rise
together), except it leverages the arguments in the other
direction. In other words, our potential comfort with
progress in the quantum realm should soothe our anxi-
eties about the block universe.
Saunders and Mermin were concerned with analogies
between arguments in quantum mechanics and the phi-
losophy of time, not a direct link. In contrast, William
Wootters directly implicates time in the origin of quan-
tum mechanics [7]. He argues that the raw material
of quantum mechanics is not complex amplitudes, but
rather measurement results. While complex amplitudes
are described as undergoing time-symmetric evolution,
measurement results are laden with time asymmetry,
as evidenced by the before/after distinction implicit in
statement (1). Wootters stops short of proposing a math-
ematical representation of this time asymmetry from
which quantum mechanics arises. Nonetheless, he does
speculate that the identification of this time asymme-
try in the resulting physical picture will not have the
fundamental objective status that we might expect from
a new piece of physics. Rather, the choice involved in
partitioning the world into subject and object will intro-
duce a fundamental flexibility that thwarts “the goal of
mirroring perfectly in one’s theory an independently ex-
isting reality” [7]. Notwithstanding the threatened loss
of objective reality, the realist will be heartened that a
coherent conception of reality can survive the program
suggested by Wootters and developed here. In fact, we
claim that by clarifying the notions of time passage and
the origins of quantum mechanics, we may place the nec-
essary concepts “system” and “observer” on surer footing
than they rest with either the traditional realist or the
instrumentalist positions.
III. A LINK BETWEEN QUANTUM
MECHANICS AND PERSONAL IDENTITY
The central work of this paper is our attempt to de-
rive quantum mechanics from a proposed mathematical
correlate to time passage. To motivate this association,
we argue that the formalism of quantum mechanics con-
tains the right kind of structure to enable us to make
sense of time passage. Consider the following version of
the Wigner’s friend thought experiment, in which Alice is
performing experiments on a qubit, and Bob has coherent
control over the joint system of Alice and the qubit [8].
Alice has prepared a pure qubit, characterized by a pair
of real numbers (e.g., the latitude and longitude on the
Bloch sphere). Now she performs a measurement in the
basis corresponding to the north-south axis. What is the
state of the qubit? It depends on who you ask. For Al-
ice, the qubit is measured to be either due north or due
south. For Bob, the entire Alice-qubit system remains a
pure state in which the qubit is entangled with Alice.
The formalism of quantum mechanics encodes a non-
trivial link between personal identity and state determi-
nation. This link distinguishes quantum from classical
physics. In classical physics, the world may look different
to observers with different knowledge, but the formalism
allows for these distinct states of knowledge to refer to
the same underlying reality. In quantum mechanics, the
two observers have different views of the world even be-
fore the notion of incomplete knowledge is introduced.
When asking questions of classical mechanics, we must
first answer “what do you know?”, while in asking ques-
tions of quantum mechanics, we must first answer “who
are you?”. Put another way, time passage (i.e., how the
two I’s in statement (1) are related) involves concepts
3that touch on a feature that distinguish quantum me-
chanics from classical mechanics. Different people may
have distinct views of reality, even accounting for differ-
ences in knowledge.
IV. EXTENDING THE LINK TO TIME
PASSAGE
Staying with the Wigner’s friend example, we observe
that when Alice measures her qubit along the north-south
axis, the latitude of the state of the qubit influences her
measurement result, but the longitude does not. But
just because this longitude degree of freedom is lost to
Alice’s results, is it in fact lost to everyone? Clearly not.
Bob can, at any point, reverse Alice’s measurement and
measure the qubit in a basis other than that correspond-
ing to the north-south axis. In performing this rever-
sal, Bob will necessarily remove any evidence of Alice’s
measurement result (“north” or “south”), even if that in-
formation had been amplified to the point at which it is
represented in Alice’s brain state. This erasure is a funda-
mental feature of quantum mechanics, and it appears in
many contexts, such as the trade-off between which-path
information and the quality of the interference pattern in
the double-slit experiment. The conclusion relevant for
our purposes is that Alice may perform her measurement
and assert that the longitude information is lost without
fear of being proven wrong, since Bob’s procedure for
recovering the longitude information will necessarily re-
move any record of her claim. Restating in the notation
of statement (1), Aliceafter may assert that the longitude
information is lost, because the procedure for revealing it
will effectively erase any record of her existence. We label
this property of quantum mechanics the “collapse defense
principle (CDP),” since it guarantees that Alice may con-
fidently assert that the wavefunction has collapsed (for
her) without fear of being proven wrong.
We view the CDP as akin to Einstein’s equivalence
principle (i.e., the connection between acceleration and
gravity). A priori, it seems like a coincidence that accel-
erating in an elevator in empty space is indistinguishable
from the effects of a uniform gravitational field. Einstein
recast this indistinguishability as a foundational princi-
ple (i.e., they are indistinguishable, because at a deep
level they are the same). Instead of simply observing
that quantum mechanics implies that longitude informa-
tion is lost to Aliceafter, we propose defining Aliceafter as
Alicebefore with the condition that longitude information
is lost. More generally, observe that in choosing a basis
for a von Neumann measurement of a quantum system,
we partition the degrees of freedom of a pure quantum
state into those that are sampled and those that are lost
(the latitude and the longitude, respectively, in Alice’s
case). We propose defining the post-measurement ob-
server as that person for whom the non-sampled degrees
of freedom are lost (“you are what you lose”).
We began by arguing that we need a correlate to time
passage, just as we needed a correlate to color before
Maxwell. We argued that quantum mechanics has the
right kind of structure to identify a connection to time
passage (“what you see depends on who you are”). Then
we recast a specific property of quantum mechanics (i.e.,
certain degrees of freedom are lost to Alice during mea-
surement) as a definition of the relationship between
Alicebefore and Aliceafter (i.e., Aliceafter is the version of
Alicebefore for whom those degrees of freedom are lost).
In describing the relationship between Alicebefore and
Aliceafter, we are providing a candidate correlate for time
passage.
It is audacious to suggest that a problem contemplated
by the ancients (“what is time passage?”) is answered
by the formalism of quantum mechanics (“you are what
you lose”). Two points may assuage the shock of this
proposal. First, before Maxwell, it would have been sim-
ilarly audacious to propose that color experience was re-
ducible to a particular kind of wave behavior of electric
and magnetic fields. Second, there is a mathematical ar-
gument that makes the connection between time passage
and quantum mechanics more plausible. We will argue
that a particularly natural model of time passage makes
quantum mechanics a forced move. If it can be demon-
strated that this is a forced move, it will add credibility to
the association of time passage with quantum mechanics,
just as the validity of Maxwell’s equations was bolstered
by the fact the predicted speed of electromagnetic waves
matched the measured speed of light.
Even lacking the demonstration that quantum me-
chanics is a forced move, the association of time passage
with the formalism of quantum mechanics is significant
for three reasons. First, if we grant that time passage
needs a correlate, the dearth of candidates makes any
proposition worth considering. Second, we have avoided
the trap of begging the question, which is the mistake one
makes when imagining that a laser pointer moving its fo-
cus along a world line provides an explanation of time
passage. That is, we propose explaining time passage in
terms of a distinct aspect of human experience (i.e., the
mathematics of quantum mechanics). Third, the specific
link we have made (“you are what you lose”) satisfies the
base requirement that it agrees with quantum mechan-
ics in its depiction of the relationship between Alicebefore
and Aliceafter. The CDP ensures operational equivalence
between the conventional quantum mechanical descrip-
tion of the post-measurement observer Aliceafter and our
identification of Aliceafter as a version of Alicebefore for
whom the information in certain degrees of freedom is
lost.
We claim that quantum mechanics provides an answer
to the question “what is time passage?”. Historically,
quantum mechanics was developed to address specific ex-
perimental results (black body radiation, atomic spectra,
etc.). However, if our claimed link between quantum me-
chanics and time passage is valid, one could imagine the
mathematical structure of quantum mechanics being de-
rived before these experimental effects were studied, us-
4ing only concepts related to time passage. This is our
task for the remainder of the paper.
V. CORRELATED SELECTION
What should a naturalized theory of time passage look
like? It should involve an observer and a system external
to the observer, and these two entities should interact.
Thus, we ground our model of passage in the framework
of measurement theory. We consider the classical mea-
surement story first, and then explore how it may be
modified to include a naturalized conception of time pas-
sage.
Consider the familiar case of classical measurement.
We begin by focusing on dichotomous variables. There
is a physical system and an observer’s memory, each of
which can take on one of two states (“1” or “0”). Mea-
surement occurs when a specific dynamics is achieved,
such that the state of the observer’s memory is retained
if the system is in state “0”, and flipped if the system is
in state “1”. That is,
(0s, 0o)→ (0s, 0o)
(1s, 0o)→ (1s, 1o)
(0s, 1o)→ (0s, 1o)
(1s, 1o)→ (1s, 0o)
(2)
where the subscripts s and o refer to the system and the
observer, respectively. When the observer prepares the
memory in state “0” (at some thermodynamic cost), this
dynamics effectively copies the state of the system into
the memory. We see this by focusing only on the first
two lines of (2). This model of measurement achieves
the intuitively necessary effect of establishing correlation
between the system and memory. There are two parts of
this model of classical measurement: the underlying dy-
namics embodied by (2) and the initial probability distri-
bution over the state space. In order to achieve a natural
embodiment of time passage, we must remove reference
to “dynamics,” as this is the concept we are trying to
explain.
Instead of dynamics, we propose correlated selection.
We imagine the initial state is one in which the sys-
tem and the observer’s memory are uncorrelated random
variables (e.g., two unfair coins with distinct probabil-
ities of coming up heads). The final state is one with
both variables having the same state, and we achieve
this by removing the cases in which they disagree. That
is, we imagine repeatedly flipping two unfair coins (with
probabilities of heads ps and po for the system coin and
the observer coin, respectively), crossing out occasions
when the two coins have different results [i.e., (1s, 0o)
and (0s, 1o)], and measuring the relative frequencies of
the two cases left over [i.e., (1s, 1o) and (0s, 0o)]. This
construction maps the two-dimensional probability space
described by
(0s, 0o) with probability p¯sp¯o
(1s, 0o) with probability psp¯o
(0s, 1o) with probability p¯spo
(1s, 1o) with probability pspo
(3)
onto the one-dimensional probability space described by
(0s, 0o) with probability p¯sp¯o/(pspo + p¯sp¯o)
(1s, 0o) with probability 0
(0s, 1o) with probability 0
(1s, 1o) with probability pspo/(pspo + p¯sp¯o)
(4)
where p¯ ≡ 1 − p. The denominator in the non-zero
terms serves to normalize the distribution. For conve-
nience, we introduce the function notation CS(ps, po) ≡
pspo/(pspo + p¯sp¯o), where CS is meant to connote corre-
lated selection.
Two observations are in order. First, this model of
time passage satisfies the base requirement that the be-
fore/after transition is characterized by a transition from
uncorrelated system and observer to correlated system
and observer. Second, the dimension of the state spaces
involved in correlated selection is the same as that in
the collapse of the wavefunction. Specifically, performing
correlated selection on two unfair coins involves mapping
a two-dimensional space onto a one-dimensional space,
just as choosing a measurement basis for a pure qubit
maps a point on a sphere to a point on a one-dimensional
probability space. This result generalizes for N-state sys-
tems (i.e., correlated selection entails 2(N − 1) degrees
of freedom for the before state, just as a pure quantum
state requires 2(N − 1) degrees of freedom). This agree-
ment of state space size is a necessary (but not sufficient)
condition for our derivation of quantum mechanics from
time passage to go through.
Correlated selection in the case N = 2 amounts to a
map from the unit square to the unit interval, and we can
visualize the map with the contour plot in Fig. 1. Notice
that each contour line forms a connected one-dimensional
subspace. Our full model of time passage suggests that
this unit square maps naturally onto a sphere, and that
the contour lines in Fig.1 can be thought of as lines of
latitude (i.e., lines of constant distance from the poles).
The fact that our model of time passage leads to a two-
state system being described with a spherical state space
(as opposed to toroidal, for example) is another necessary
but not sufficient property for the purposes of linking to
the Bloch sphere of quantum mechanics.
We pause in our derivation of quantum mechanics from
time passage to address a natural objection. We are
claiming that preparing a pure quantum state is in some
sense equivalent to preparing a joint probability distribu-
tion over the random variables associated with the system
and observer. One might make the following objection:
preparing a quantum state does not feel like preparing
5Figure 1. The mechanism for time passage presented in this
paper entails postselecting uncorrelated random variables cor-
responding to observer (x-axis) and system (y-axis), such that
cases in which these two variables agree are retained. This
process leads to an outcome random variable which is “1”
with probability CS(ps, po), illustrated above with contour
lines. The mechanism for time passage is completed by intro-
ducing a distance function on this unit square, as described
in the text.
a joint probability distribution over the system and ob-
server. We reply that anytime a concept is explained, it
is common to feel that something is lost and something
is unwelcome. For example, in the case of color, one is
tempted to ask: “But what is the actual color of the pho-
ton, putting aside its interactions with physical matter?”
Similarly, the problems brought along by Maxwell’s equa-
tions (“What medium supports the waves?”), can make
one doubt their utility if we lose sight of the explanatory
work they do. Likewise, asking for a dynamical underpin-
ning of correlated selection (“Where did these excluded
non-correlated cases go?”) or objecting to the mathe-
matics proposed as the correlate for time passage (“Why
correlated selection?”) are natural questions but should
be put aside if we judge that the desired explanatory
work has been accomplished.
VI. PREPARATION AND MEASUREMENT
Our model of time passage is not yet finished. To see
why, we observe that if the “before” state is characterized
by two degrees of freedom (a point on the unit square)
and the “after” state is characterized by one degree of
freedom (a point on the unit interval), then two distinct
“before” states that map to the same “after” state will be
experimentally indistinguishable. For this mechanism to
match the experience of the observer, the two dimensions
of the “before” state must be experimentally accessible.
Here we make our first of two appeals to the notion of
reality. For it to make sense for the observer to refer to an
object, the observer must incorporate the notion of state
preparation and state measurement. An experimental
apparatus typically has a number of controllable degrees
of freedom, along with an output readable by the ob-
server. Without a distinction between state preparation
and state measurement, the experimental process would
amount to an unstructured lookup table. Physics begins
when the observer divides the controllable degrees of free-
dom into those used for preparing a state of the system
and those used to specify the measurement. In classical
physics, this issue is barely worth pointing out, since the
physical theory unambiguously identifies the reality un-
derlying the observer’s interaction with the system. In
quantum mechanics, the preparation/measurement issue
is complicated by the lingering controversy about how
the formalism is broken down into ontology and episte-
mology. For example, in a quantum optics experiment,
a single optical element may be considered part of state
preparation or state measurement, with no change in the
experimental results. Notwithstanding this complication
in the quantum case, a distinction between preparation
and measurement is still necessary in any physics.
Turning to our model of time passage, what mathe-
matical construction could play the role of distinguish-
ing between state preparation and measurement? Our
model associates the observer’s description of the state
of affairs before measurement with a point on the unit
square. State preparation and state measurement are
closely allied, as each relates to the observer’s view of
the world. State preparation conveys what the observer
knows about the world, and state measurement conveys
what the observer is asking about the world. Thus, it is
natural to mirror this duality in our model.
Correlated selection is a mechanism for mapping a
point on the unit square to a point on the unit interval
(characterizing a probability distribution on the binary
outcome variable). To incorporate the notion of state
preparation and state measurement, we propose extend-
ing this mechanism to entail a mapping between a pair
of points on the unit square to a point on the unit in-
terval. We achieve this mechanism in two steps. First,
we geometrize the unit square by introducing a distance
function D. Second, we use a probability function which
maps distance to probability (Pr
D
). Specifically, we pro-
pose a distance function D on the unit square such that
points on the same contour line in Fig. 1 are equidistant
from the point (1,1). Defining D in this way constrains
the probability function Pr
D
. For example, by traveling
on the straight line between points (1,1) and (0,0), we
may use D and CS(ps, po) to generate probability func-
tion Pr
D
.
This step completes the specification of our proposed
6mathematical correlate of time passage. In summary,
we propose that time passage is correlated selection in
the context of a geometrized joint probability space over
observer and system. We next illustrate this construction
with a specific distance function and then argue for the
forced move to quantum mechanics.
VII. CHOOSING A DISTANCE FUNCTION
Our model of time passage requires that a distance
function be defined on the unit square such that the
points along a given contour line in Fig. 1 are equidis-
tant from the point (1,1). Here we provide an example of
such a distance function. We then draw a connection be-
tween this example and quantum mechanics. Finally, we
argue that a necessary constraint on any such distance
function makes this connection a forced move.
We define our distance function first by mapping the
unit square to the sphere and then by employing the
natural distance function on the sphere (i.e., the angle
created by lines passing through the center of the sphere
and the two points in question). The particular form of
the map we choose is given by
θ(po, ps) = QM
−1 [CS(ps, po)] ∗ (180◦/pi)
φ(po, ps) = (ps − 0.5) ∗ 360◦,
(5)
where QM(θ) ≡ cos2(θ/2) is the quantum mechanical
probability function, QM−1(p) = 2 arccos
√
p is the in-
verse of QM, θ is the colatitude (0◦ at the north pole,
180◦ at the south pole), and φ is the longitude. This
association of the unit square with points on the sphere
is illustrated in Fig.2. The lines of latitude map to the
contour lines of Fig. 1.
We claim that an observer in this model will see a
physics indistinguishable from quantum mechanics. The
argument is proof by construction. The distance func-
tion given by Eqns. (5) entails a state space (points on a
sphere) with probability of projection of one state onto
another given by QM(θ) where θ is the angle between
preparation and measurement states. This combination
of state space and probability function is precisely the
mathematics of a two-state quantum system. Note that
this argument works for other possible distance functions.
For example, Eqns. (5) describe a linear relationship be-
tween φ and ps; however, the connection to quantum
mechanics is maintained for any continuous one-to-one
map between φ and ps.
In the model we are considering, the observer manipu-
lates degrees of freedom to choose preparation and mea-
surement states by, for example, turning knobs on an ex-
perimental apparatus. The calibration markings on these
knobs are not provided to the observer; rather, they are
constructed using the results of the observer’s measure-
ments. Thus, all choices of distance function compatible
with quantum mechanics will be indistinguishable to the
observer. Therefore, we consider all such distance func-
Figure 2. Depicted is a graphical representation of the dis-
tance function described in section VII. The axes and contour
lines are retained from Fig. 1. In order to find the distance
between points on the unit square, we map to the correspond-
ing points on the sphere and measure the angle subtended by
these points and the center of the sphere. The lines of lati-
tude coincide with the contour lines of Fig. 1. The mapping
of a particular value of latitude to a particular contour line is
chosen such that the resulting relationship between distance
and probability matches the quantum mechanical probability
function QM(θ) = cos2(θ/2).
tions operationally equivalent for the purposes of this ar-
gument.
We have shown that our mechanism for passage is con-
sistent with quantum mechanics. We are now in a posi-
tion to argue that quantum mechanics is a forced move
given our mechanism for passage. The final step relates
to the status of statistical mixtures of preparation states.
It is a property of quantum mechanics that regardless of
the complexity of a statistical source of quantum states,
the source may be characterized by a finite description
(i.e., the density matrix). Were this not so, state deter-
mination of mixed states would be impossible (i.e., there
would be no finite number of measurement settings suf-
ficient to completely characterize the state). We denote
this property with the phrase “mixtures have state” and
the abbreviation MHS.
It may seem that MHS is a quirk of quantum mechan-
ics. We argue that in fact MHS is a requirement for any
physics. Earlier in the paper we argued that the concept
of state preparation and measurement is implicit in the
idea of physics. Take it away, and we simply have a jour-
nal of unstructured interventions and observations. Here
7we extend that argument to insist that the state descrip-
tion must be a finite function of the number of distinct
output states, even in the case of statistical mixtures.
For an N -state system, this finite function is N − 1 in
the classical case, and it is N2 − 1 in the quantum case.
The argument is simply that physics could not proceed if
such a finite function did not exist. As mentioned above,
state determination would be impossible. In the absence
of an operational method for characterizing states and
making predictions about measurements, physics is im-
possible. Thus, we argue that MHS is a necessary feature
of any potential model of the world.
We now make the central conjecture of this paper:
Conjecture 1 Any choice of a distance function which
satisfies MHS yields a physics indistinguishable from
quantum mechanics.
While we do not provide a proof of this conjecture here,
we make a claim of plausibility by referring to Hardy’s
derivation of quantum mechanics from five reasonable ax-
ioms [9]. Hardy was able to show that if a physics has a
state space such that the number of degrees of freedom of
a mixed state is N2−1 for an N -state system, then quan-
tum mechanics is a forced move. The question becomes
then, why should a mixed state have N2 − 1 degrees of
freedom, as opposed to the more familiar N − 1 of clas-
sical probability theory. We claim that our argument for
the necessity of a mechanism for time passage provides an
answer to this question. Since we need a mechanism for
time flow, and our proposed mechanism entails 2(N − 1)
degrees of freedom for pure states, what remains is to
adapt Hardy’s proof to start with the dimensionality of
pure states, rather than mixed states.
Before concluding, we point out that the MHS con-
straint provides a particularly intuitive explanation of
why the quantum probability function takes the form
cos2(θ/2), as opposed to say, cos4(θ/2). Figure 3 shows a
trigonometric identity which suggests a geometric inter-
pretation of the quantum probability rule. Consider two
points on the Bloch sphere, A and B. If we wish to know
the probability that the quantum state corresponding to
B will project onto the state corresponding to A, we may
orient the great circle defined by A and B on the x − y
plane, such that the point A is at the top with y coor-
dinate 1. The probability we seek is simply the y-value
of the coordinates of B. This association of probabil-
ity with coordinate is true if and only if our probability
function is cos2(θ/2). Given this relationship, there is
a direct analogy between finding the center of mass of
an arbitrary number of point masses on the surface of a
sphere and finding the density matrix corresponding to
an arbitrary statistical ensemble of pure qubits. We do
not claim that this argument serves as a derivation of
quantum mechanics; rather, it bolsters the plausibility of
conjecture 1.
Figure 3. This figure demonstrates the connection between
the quantum probability function cos2(θ/2) and the property
that mixtures have state (MHS). Given two pure qubits repre-
sented by points A and B on the Block sphere, the probability
that A will project onto B is given by cos2(θ/2), where θ is
the angle subtended by A, the center of the sphere, and B.
This probability is also the height of B along the y-axis when
the great circle defined by A and B is oriented such that A is
at the point (0.5, 1). From this relation, it is clear that cal-
culating a density matrix is equivalent to finding the center
of mass of a system of point masses. In each case, a poten-
tially infinite description is condensed into a finite number of
degrees of freedom.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In ref. [9], Hardy derives quantum mechanics from sur-
prisingly innocuous axioms. One way to summarize his
accomplishment is to assert: If you have a reason to
use more than N-1 degrees of freedom to represent an
N -state system, then you need no longer puzzle about
the form of quantum mechanics, as its precise structure
is constrained by uncontroversial operational considera-
tions. This summary highlights the connection to our
mechanism for time passage, since at the heart of the
mechanism is correlated selection. We arrived at corre-
lated selection by looking for a way to encode the ob-
server’s identity in the relationship between before and
after. Crucially, this encoding requires that certain pos-
sible outcomes are removed from the set of all possible
outcomes, such that the number of parameters needed
to describe ‘after’ is less than that needed to describe
‘before’. It is an encouraging fact that the number of
parameters specified by correlated selection (i.e., 2N − 2
for pure states) matches that of a pure quantum state.
8Furthermore, this match motivates our conjecture that
Hardy’s derivation can be adapted to show that corre-
lated selection makes quantum mechanics a forced move.
In the spirit of John Wheeler, we have argued that
quantum mechanics arises from a distinction between sys-
tem and observer. To have an observer, we need natural-
ized time passage, described here as correlated selection
in the context of a geometrized joint probability space.
To have a system, we require that mixtures have state. If
the hypothesized connection between our model of time
passage and Hardy’s work can be established, we are left
with a novel approach to Wheeler’s questions. “How
come existence?” Because a distance function can be
found that satisfies MHS. “Why the quantum?” Because
all such distance functions are operationally equivalent
to quantum mechanics.
IX. FUTURE DIRECTIONS
An obvious next step is to prove conjecture 1, either
by adapting Hardy’s proof or using some other method.
If the conjecture is wrong, and there are other distance
functions which satisfy MHS, it would be interesting to
investigate the properties of the resulting non-quantum
mechanical model(s) of physics.
We have proposed that quantum mechanics can be de-
rived from probability theory and a conception of system
and observer based on discrete mathematics. There is
evidence that relativity (both special and general) can
be derived in similar ways [10]. Perhaps the long-sought
unification of quantum mechanics and relativity can be
achieved when we arrive at these theories from so simple
a beginning.
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